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Freedom of expression,
deliberation, autonomy
and respect
Christian F. Rostbøll
University of Copenhagen
Abstract
This paper elaborates on the deliberative democracy argument for freedom of expres-
sion in terms of its relationship to different dimensions of autonomy. It engages the
objection that Enlightenment theories pose a threat to cultures that reject autonomy
and argues that autonomy-based democracy is not only compatible with but necessary
for respect for cultural diversity. On the basis of an intersubjective epistemology, it
argues that people cannot know how to live on mutually respectful terms without
engaging in public deliberation and developing some degree of personal autonomy.
While freedom of expression is indispensable for deliberation and autonomy, this
does not mean that people have no obligations regarding how they speak to each
other. The moral insights provided by deliberation depend on the participants in the
process treating one another with respect. The argument is related to the Danish
cartoon controversy.
Keywords
autonomy, Danish cartoon controversy, deliberative democracy, freedom of expression,
liberalism, respect
Freedom of expression has become a central battleﬁeld in multicultural societies, as
seen most dramatically in the recent Danish cartoon controversy. A core argument
for freedom of expression is its indispensability for democracy. The cartoons of the
Prophet Muhammad published by a Danish newspaper in 2005, and attracting
enormous international attention and protests in 2006 and again in 2008, were
also defended, inter alia, with reference to the idea that vigorous public debate is
a prerequisite for democracy. The principle of near absolute freedom of expression
might be perceived as being in conﬂict with an equally important principle of
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respect for diﬀerence. This conﬂict corresponds to arguments in liberal political
theory concerning the relationship between autonomy and respect, enlightenment
and tolerance. During the cartoon controversy, a number of Danish Muslims
pitted a demand for respect for their religious feelings against Jyllands-Posten’s
right to publish the cartoons,1 while some defenders of the cartoons insisted that
respect for religion is incompatible with freedom of expression.
This paper considers the role of free expression in deliberative democracy. The
deliberative model of democracy is of particular interest in connection to the
alleged conﬂict between freedom of expression and autonomy on the one hand
and respect and religious feelings on the other hand for two reasons. First, the link
between free expression and democracy is stronger in the deliberative model than in
other models of democracy. Second, autonomy is a key principle in deliberative
democracy in a way that it is not in other models of democracy. Is deliberative
democracy a form of autonomy-based theory and practice that does not show
suﬃcient concern for the principle of respect for diversity? Is the idea that political
decisions should be justiﬁed in common deliberation hostile to cultural diversity?
To what extent does public deliberation require autonomous preference formation
and to what extent, if at all, is that incompatible with respect for cultures that do
not value autonomy?
Freedom of expression and deliberative democracy
Freedom of expression is often justiﬁed with reference to its connection to democ-
racy. In order to show an internal relationship between democracy and freedom of
expression, however, not just any conception of democracy will do.2 I shall argue
that the relationship between free expression and democracy is particularly robust
in the deliberative conception of democracy. The reason why the latter presupposes
freedom of expression is that it is a conception of democracy that embodies ideals
of autonomy. Deliberative democracy not only presupposes an ideal of political
autonomy, it also prescribes a procedure for individuals to develop autonomous
understandings of their own political preferences.
In order for ‘democracy’ to provide a secure foundation for freedom of expres-
sion, it cannot be deﬁned merely as a form of government in which the present
majority has its desires implemented. Critics of the democracy argument argue
that, as a right, freedom of expression restrains the ability of the majority to do
as it likes, and therefore a conﬂict exists between freedom of expression and democ-
racy as majority rule.3 Even if democracy requires that decisions must ultimately be
made by the majority, however, this is no reason to identify democracy with imple-
menting whatever desires the present majority has, for this might make it diﬃcult
for new majorities to form in the future.4 For example, if the majority decides to
prohibit criticism of its own policies, democratic elections will no longer be possible
because the people will lack the basis for deciding who to vote for in the future.
If democracy is the fundamental ideal we wish to protect and promote, it can
hardly be used to justify laws that undermine its own future possibility.
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The problem with majoritarian conceptions of democracy is that they confuse a
technical decision-making procedure with an intrinsic value.5
A stronger democracy argument is one that sees popular sovereignty as the ideal
to strive for and that holds that, if the people are free to express their beliefs and
values, they will actually be able to rule themselves.6 This justiﬁcation of freedom of
expression is based on a conception of autonomy, namely the political autonomy of
being subject only to laws that one has been able to participate in the making of. To
understand what political autonomy means and how freedom of expression is a
prerequisite for its exercise, we must elaborate the argument that democracy
cannot be identiﬁed with majority rule. To begin with, we cannot reduce the
democratic process to an exercise of will. If we regard democracy as a form of
government in which the majority decides on the basis of its given preferences,
political autonomy exercised by citizens in common becomes impossible, and
democracy and freedom of expression can indeed come into conﬂict. It makes no
sense to speak about collective autonomy when legitimate law is seen as nothing but
the expression of the will of the majority, because the minority will lack any oppor-
tunity to inﬂuence law and thus will be heteronymous under those conditions.
Freedom of expression can be shown to be internally connected to democracy
only when the latter is understood as not only being about voting but also about
forming one’s opinion about how to vote. The people can be seen as collectively
autonomous only if the laws are not merely an expression of the will of the majority
but are also inﬂuenced by the opinions of the minority. Political autonomy is not
expressed in the moment of decision in isolation but over time when majorities
change and when the decisions have also been inﬂuenced by the minority.7
Furthermore, the key to the legitimate change of majorities and the minority
exercising inﬂuence on decisions is exactly that the majority cannot prohibit the
expression of certain opinions. The medium through which the people can collec-
tively participate in the making of the law is not the vote (where only some can
actually be seen as subject to their own will), but public deliberation in which
everyone in principle can inﬂuence everyone else and gain some inﬂuence on the
ﬁnal result.
This is an argument for freedom of expression that relies on a model of democ-
racy that is not concerned ‘simply to implement existing desires’,8 but rather to
‘ensure the fullness and richness of public debate’.9 The core of democracy is not
merely that the people govern themselves but that they do so ‘reﬂectively and
deliberately’.10 Freedom of expression is a prerequisite for the entire people to be
able to inﬂuence decision-making but also a means for each citizen to develop a
form of internal autonomy that lies in reﬂectively forming the political opinions she
expresses in the democratic process.11 When political autonomy is perceived to
require processes of reﬂective opinion formation, then there is no longer a conﬂict
between democracy and freedom of expression. Freedom of expression is justiﬁed
not as a prerequisite for the majority getting its way but with reference to what is
required for a legitimate process of opinion and will formation. A legitimate
democratic process requires that only ‘relevant preferences and convictions’
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inﬂuence political outcomes,12 i.e. preferences and convictions formed on the basis
of the best reasons or autonomously.
I have argued that one can show an internal relationship between democracy
and freedom of expression with a model of democracy that embodies ideals of
political autonomy and the autonomous formation of political opinions.13 This
is the deliberative model of democracy. I believe (and have argued elsewhere)
that the best way to understand deliberative democracy is to regard it as incorpo-
rating dimensions of collective and individual freedom and autonomy in a manner
unlike any other model of democracy.14 A core aspect of deliberative democracy is
that the democratic process should not merely aggregate given preferences but
promote the conditions of reﬂective and autonomous opinion and will formation.
Moreover, the aim of public deliberation is not simply to ﬁnd a compromise that is
acceptable for the majority of citizens, but rather to ﬁnd arguments that everyone
can accept. The legitimacy of political decisions lies in their being a product of a
process in which everyone was able to take part and contribute with their view-
points. Majority decisions are necessary, but only as a technical decision-making
procedure; the ideal to be promoted is that everyone inﬂuences law-making and
exercises their political autonomy in common deliberation.15
Respect versus autonomy
We have seen that one way for the democracy argument for freedom of expression
to succeed is to make it with reference to a conception of democracy that has
autonomy as a central principle, and that deliberative democracy is such a concep-
tion. As a result of the increased awareness of the importance of cultural diversity
among political theorists, theories based on the principle of autonomy have now
come under attack. Political liberals such as John Rawls and Charles Larmore
reject justifying liberal principles on the basis of comprehensive conceptions of
autonomy;16 liberal pluralists such as William Galston hold that liberalism must
not take sides with autonomy and reﬂection and against tradition and faith;17 and
libertarian Chandran Kukathas insists that the state has no business in promoting
a value such as autonomy, which many people do not regard to be part of their
conception of the good.18
The criticism of autonomy-based political theories begins from the empirical
premise that not everyone in multicultural societies shares a commitment to auton-
omy. It goes on to argue that the value of autonomy is something about which
reasonable people disagree. Autonomy-based theories are therefore sectarian and
fail to show respect for members of cultures which do not see autonomy as a core
value. Such theories are sometimes connected to the Enlightenment project of
critical reﬂection and criticism of tradition and religion. According to Galston,
‘Autonomy-based arguments are bound to marginalize those individuals and
groups who cannot conscientiously embrace the Enlightenment project.’19 Joshua
Cohen has criticized theories that justify freedom of expression on the basis of
autonomy. He rejects the argument ‘that expression always trumps other values
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because of its connection with autonomy’, for ‘this suggests that a commitment to
freedom of expression turns on embracing the supreme value of autonomy. But this
threatens to turn freedom of expression into a sectarian political position.’ It is
sectarian because ‘the idea that autonomy is the fundamental human good [is] an
idea about which there is much reasonable controversy’.20
Do these objections to autonomy-based theories apply to deliberative democ-
racy in general and to the deliberative democratic defence of freedom of expression
in particular? The objections can be divided between (1) sectarianism in autonomy-
justiﬁcations of a norm, e.g. freedom of expression, and (2) disrespect caused by the
application of a norm, e.g. freedom of expression, justiﬁed with reference to auton-
omy. I would like to relate this question to the Danish cartoon controversy. In the
Danish public debate about the cartoons in 2005–6, freedom of expression was
repeatedly defended with (vague) references to the values of the Enlightenment.
While there were no direct rejections of these values among Danish Muslims, the
core norm they appealed to was respect, and particularly respect for religious
feelings.21 Thus, at least from a superﬁcial perspective, there is reason to describe
the conﬂict as one between enlightenment and tolerance, autonomy and respect.
The more speciﬁc question that the cartoon case raises in relation to deliberative
democracy is whether the way in which autonomy is presupposed by deliberative
democracy justiﬁes (and even encourages) disrespect for religious feelings. In other
words, is the conception of autonomy presupposed by deliberative democracy and
in deliberative democratic justiﬁcations for freedom of expression incompatible
with respect for diversity? In order to respond to this question, we must further
analyse to the conception of autonomy to which deliberative democracy is – or
should be – committed. And we must clarify exactly what role autonomy plays in
the theory and how this relates to expression. Once that is done, we can consider
whether this understanding of autonomy is the same that many have objected to
and whether or not it is objectionable.
What kind of autonomy is presupposed by
deliberative democracy?
The manner in which autonomy is presupposed by the ideal of deliberative democ-
racy is complex. One approach is to begin with the idea that deliberative democracy
is tied to the notion of the common good. According to Cohen, deliberative democ-
racy is ‘a democratic association in which public debate is focused on the common
good of its members’,22 i.e. it is an association in which the members are committed
to ﬁnding decisions promoting the legitimate ends of everyone. In Habermas’s
terms, the aim that has priority in democratic deliberation is to ﬁnd solutions
that are ‘equally good for all’ or ‘in the equal interest of all’.23
I would like to suggest that the notion of the common good as understood in
deliberative democracy makes the latter committed, at a basic level, to the idea of
moral autonomy, as exercised in common. I distinguish here between moral and
personal autonomy. Personal autonomy regards one’s own good; how one chooses
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or endorses one’s life plan, goals and aims; and how one interprets one’s needs and
interests. Moral autonomy concerns ‘the relation between one person’s pursuit of
his own ends and others’ pursuit of theirs’.24 Moral autonomy is not about what is
good for me but about what can be universalized. Thus, while personal autonomy
is about the individual good – about whether it has been reﬂectively endorsed –
moral autonomy is about the common good and how it has been determined and
justiﬁed.
It is therefore misguided to object that deliberative democracy is wrong because
it promotes a speciﬁc conception of the good life, for the conception of autonomy it
is committed to does not pertain to what the good life is, but rather to what is
equally good for all – given that people have diﬀerent ideas about what is good for
them individually. Any objection would have to be committed to the idea that it is
wrong to aim at what is equally good for all in a critical-reﬂective way. Deliberative
democracy does not – or at least need not – rely on autonomy as a conception of
the individual good but only on autonomy as the way in which we determine the
common good and become subject to the norms that this requires, i.e. on moral
autonomy exercised in common.25
It is possible, however, that, in order for people to be morally autonomous, they
must also be at least minimally personally autonomous. Gerald Gaus has argued
that the latter is indeed the case.26 In order to be morally autonomous, one must be
able to distinguish between what is good for oneself (or what are reasons for me),
and what is good for everyone (or what are reasons for everyone). People must be
capable of self-reﬂection and role-taking in order to understand that other people
do not share their conception of the good and in order to respect them equally.
What is equally good for all or what constitutes good moral reasons is open-ended,
for which reason ‘liberal citizens have an ongoing commitment to examine
proposed justiﬁcations and enter into justiﬁcatory argument’.27 Deliberative
democrats such as Habermas agree with Gaus about the importance of role-
taking and that moral reasons are open-ended. Deliberation can contribute to
ﬁnding the best reasons, reasons that are justiﬁable to everyone under conditions
where no force is involved other than that of the better argument, only if parti-
cipants are able and willing to consider the world from the perspective of others
and transcend their own particular worldview. Deliberation requires that everyone
. . . take the perspective of everyone else and thus to project herself into the under-
standings of self and world of all others; from this interlocking of perspectives there
emerges an ideally extended ‘we perspective’ from which all can test in common
whether they wish to make a controversial norm the basis of their shared practice.28
How does the conception of autonomy presupposed by the idea that deliberation
should aim at the common good relate to the aspects of autonomy emphasized in
the discussion of freedom of expression? I previously emphasized the idea of polit-
ical autonomy and autonomous formation of political opinions. Now I suggest that
the reason why deliberative democrats stress – or rather the reason why they should
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stress – the importance of autonomous opinion and will formation is that it is the
only way people can reach an understanding of what is equally good for all. Thus,
autonomous opinion formation is not an end in itself but rather a prerequisite for
reaching just decisions: people must be able to distinguish what is good for each
from his or her perspective and what is equally good for all, which requires self-
reﬂection or at least a minimal degree of personal autonomy. In short, personal
autonomy is needed for moral autonomy, which is again needed for and part of
political autonomy.29 The idea of the common good also relates to the argument
that democracy is an ideal beyond simple majority rule, namely rule by everyone.
Only if the aim is political decisions acceptable to all and if everyone has inﬂuence
on determining what is acceptable can we expect political decisions to express the
common good. I am assuming that what the common good consists of is open-
ended and can be determined only by those for whom it is equally good. This latter
assumption is epistemological and the subject of the next section.
Intersubjective epistemology and autonomy
I argued earlier that it is misguided to think that deliberative democracy is (or need
be) committed to personal autonomy as a basic value or to promoting it as a
constituent of the good life. Nevertheless, deliberative democracy must promote
some degree of personal autonomy in order to achieve its aims. Deliberative
democracy thus requires a derivative defence of the value of personal autonomy.
This defence relies on the assumption (which will be further justiﬁed presently) that
people can reach just decisions only through public deliberation. Just decisions
depend on people exercising their political autonomy.
I will consider whether this argument is objectionable from the perspective of a
principle of respect for diﬀerence. In one version of such an objection, Galston
argues that deliberation as a form of moral learning can pose a threat to tolerance
of religious diversity.30 The limits on state power cannot, he thinks, be left to
democratic deliberation; rather, they must be secured from without. In other
words, he sees a conﬂict between the deliberative conception of political autonomy
and the protection of negative freedom.31 It might seem as though Galston’s point
does not apply to my case, since he is defending negative freedom and should
therefore be in favour of freedom of expression; however, the issue here is not
the legal right of freedom of expression but its justiﬁcation and its use to promote
personal autonomy to the extent that this is necessary for deliberation to reach just
outcomes. Galston’s objection regards mainly the second form of sectarianism men-
tioned earlier, i.e. sectarianism in the application of a norm justiﬁed with reference to
autonomy.He believes that tolerance and respect are principles that should constrain
democratic deliberation and the exercise of political autonomy from the outside. I
question the claim that we should regard respect and tolerance as external constraints
on the democratic process. Even if we agree with the principles, without common
deliberation, they are too vague to tell us how to treat others in concrete cases.
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The demand for respect is a demand to be treated as an equal. But what equal
treatment means and requires in speciﬁc cases is by no means given.
Consider here the defence of the Muhammad cartoons produced by the editor
responsible, Flemming Rose:
We have a tradition of satire [in Denmark] . . .The cartoonists treated Islam the same
way they treat Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism and other religions. And by treating
Muslims in Denmark as equals they made a point: We are integrating you into the
Danish tradition of satire because you are part of our society, not strangers.
The cartoons are including, rather than excluding, Muslims.32
Like-minded Danes held that Muslims fail to see that ‘satire and caricatures of
religious and political authorities are not expressions of disrespect for or ridicule of
groups because of their faith or beliefs’.33 These members of the majority culture
insist that they are not violating principles of equality and respect; however, the
thing is that they take the meaning of these principles as given – and as understood
by themselves but not by the Muslims claiming to be disrespected. Supporters of
Jyllands-Posten, including Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, went
so far as to state that there is nothing to be discussed here. One of the actions that
led to the escalation of the crisis was Rasmussen’s refusal, in October 2005, to meet
with a group of diplomats from Muslim countries who had complained about the
negative portrayal of Islam in the Danish public sphere.34 Rasmussen told the
press, ‘This is a matter of principle. I won’t meet with them because it is so crys-
tal clear what principles Danish democracy is built upon that there is no reason
to do so.’35
Here, respect is not rejected as an irrelevant norm but rather placed outside the
process of public deliberation.36 What respect means was seen as given and it was
subsequently denied, without discussion with the oﬀended party, that Muslims had
been disrespected by the cartoons. This demonstrates the shortcoming of regarding
respect as a principle that can stand as an external constraint on the democratic
process. Indeed, there might be a danger in believing that an abstract principle of
respect is suﬃcient to constrain public deliberation. I am not denying that we need
a commitment to respect before we enter into deliberation; my point is that the
meaning and implication of this principle must be recursively determined in
common deliberation by the aﬀected parties – otherwise the interpretation of the
principle will most likely be biased.37
Let me present a more positive and systematic formulation of my argument
regarding why the principle of respect depends on public deliberation. My argu-
ment is that we cannot know how to live on mutually respectful terms without
engaging in common deliberation. This is an epistemological argument about how
to achieve the necessary insights to live on respectful terms. I defend an intersub-
jective epistemology according to which, following Thomas Hill, ‘moral insight is
not the special endowment of any group but is something that can only emerge
gradually as diverse but mutually respectful human beings engage seriously in
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communication about how best to live together despite their diﬀerences’.38 Note
that respect ﬁgures both as a prerequisite for public deliberation reaching its aim of
generating moral insight as well as an outcome of the same process: in order to
know how to live on mutually respectful terms, we must treat one another with
respect in the process that aims to determine these terms.39 This appears paradox-
ical, for how can I deliberate respectfully if I can know what respectful expressions
are only as a result of deliberation with those whom I might show disrespect for?
Naturally, the understanding of the respect that is a prerequisite for public delib-
eration and the understanding resulting from deliberation cannot be the same.
My suggestion is that a minimal degree of respect is required in deliberation in
order for deliberation to result in a more adequate, full and shared understanding
of respect.40 Personal autonomy is part of this picture, too, insofar as it is required
for generating moral insight, including insight into what it means and entails to
treat others with respect.
The ﬁrst premise of the epistemological argument is that in order to respect
someone, in particular someone whose culture is foreign to me, it is not suﬃcient
to merely recognize that she is a person in the Kantian sense. Even if the reason
why I must respect someone is that she is a person (something I cannot go into
here),41 I cannot respect her without knowing something about her as a particular
or concrete person. Without some knowledge of the other’s particularity, I will tend
to think that I show respect for him or her by following my own culture’s norms of
what it means to respect others (cf. the quotes already given from the cartoon
controversy).42
Second, the best way to learn about others is to allow them to speak for
themselves and to be open to their perspectives. The ﬁrst insight that is acquired
in public deliberation is how the world looks from the perspective of others.
Here, we see the need for some degree of personal autonomy, namely for the
capacity and openness to assume the perspective of the other. One can only take
the perspective of the other by taking a step back from one’s own view of
the world.
Third, it is not suﬃcient that we have knowledge of each other as particular
persons with particular understandings of respect; we must also reach an agreement
on how to live together. To live on mutually respectful terms, we must agree on
what this means and requires of us. In other words, we must deliberate on what is
equally good for all, which requires the ability to distinguish between what are
reasons for me – from the perspective of my culture – and what are reasons for
others. This again requires taking a step back from and reﬂecting on one’s own
particular worldview.
Fourth, the epistemological point goes further than the idea that we only can
know each others’ needs and understandings of respect in common deliberation.
Moreover, the argument is that we can only have a rational presumption that we
have got right what it means to live on respectful terms if the agreement is a result
of a procedure that suﬃciently approximates some ideal conditions, namely those
excluding all other forces than that of the better argument.43
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Fifth, there is a connection between these points and political autonomy.
It follows from the intersubjective epistemology that we can know what is right
only if everyone has the opportunity to inﬂuence the outcome, and that is exactly
what is required by the ideal of political autonomy, as already described in relation
to the deliberative democratic argument for freedom of expression. This argument
also entails that people cannot know what is equally good for all and what mutual
respect requires in particular cases if they do not speak for themselves and exercise
political autonomy in common.44
Regarding the relationship between autonomy and respect, the result of the
analysis of an intersubjective epistemology is somewhat paradoxical. On the one
hand, it has been suggested that public deliberation must be respectful to achieve
its epistemic aims. On the other hand, public deliberation also requires that
everyone be willing to participate in deliberation and to critically reﬂect on
their own commitments, their culture and religion. Public deliberation to achieve
its epistemic aims must be both respectful and promote personal autonomy.
We are thus left with the diﬃcult question of whether promoting autonomy
and requiring self-reﬂection concerning one’s deepest commitments is not disre-
spectful toward members of cultures that do not regard autonomy as a funda-
mental value.
Before proceeding, I must consider the objection to the epistemological argu-
ment that expressing oneself in disrespectful ways could contribute to the aim of
determining what respect means and implies. In order to determine the limits of
respectful expression, this objection goes, it might be necessary to go beyond these
limits. Part of this objection is that constraining oneself from disrespectful expres-
sions might prevent one from saying what is in fact not disrespectful; hence, the
limits of respectful expression are set too narrowly. This objection shows that the
epistemological argument requires that one does not constrain oneself unduly, but
not that obvious and extreme forms of disrespectful expression can be justiﬁed.
Testing the limits of deliberation can be justiﬁed on epistemic grounds, but this
justiﬁcation extends only to expressions around these limits and only when they are
aimed at better understanding these limits.
Respectful expression and public deliberation
Deliberative democracy is internally related to freedom of expression because it is a
model of democracy that presupposes autonomy. This makes it an autonomy-
based theory; however, I do not think that the interesting objection is that delib-
erative democracy is based on autonomy as a conception of the good (as Kukathas
objects to) or that the correlative justiﬁcation of freedom of expression requires
that one embrace ‘autonomy as the fundamental human good’ (as Cohen would
object to). In the preceding argument, autonomy does not ﬁgure as a human good;
personal autonomy is seen not as a fundamental but only as a derivative value.
There is a clear priority of the right over the good, as understood by Rawls, in the
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deliberative democratic view of the common good as I have described it. Citizens
searching for the common good in deliberation give priority to the aim to ‘specify
the boundaries that men’s system of ends must respect’.45 The collective exercise of
moral autonomy has been justiﬁed as internally connected to this view of the right;
not as a human good that must be maximized.
Thus, I reject the notion that deliberative democracy and its justiﬁcation of free-
dom of expression is sectarian. The standing objection holds that it is disrespectful
to aim at promoting personal autonomy among persons who do not value
this or who value other things more.46 This objection concerns sectarianism in
the application of freedom of expression when justiﬁed on the basis of autonomy.
If the preceding argument is valid, the epistemic aim of deliberative democracy
depends on promoting some degree of personal autonomy among citizens, and
free expression is a prime means to this end. This objection is also the most relevant
objection in relation to the Danish cartoon controversy during which some defended
the cartoons with reference to the aim of provoking critical self-reﬂection among
Muslims.
How can we respond to this objection? Should we abandon the deliberative ideal
and morally condemn or even legally prohibit speech promoting personal auton-
omy among persons who do not see critical reﬂection as part of their conception of
the good? One problem with this solution is that it would undermine the very
precondition of securing the mutual respect that is the reason for the condemnation
or prohibition. If the aim is laws that secure equal treatment for everyone as well as
a public culture of mutual respect among people committed to diﬀerent cultures,
then we cannot dispense with the conditions that are necessary to create them.
And these conditions are ones that promote public deliberation in which everyone
is willing to consider not only what is good for her or him individually but
also what is good for others, which requires critical reﬂection or a degree of
personal autonomy.
Consider further the fact that the Muslims who felt disrespected in the cartoon
case demanded that the members of the majority culture step back from their own
culture and consider how the case looks from the Muslim perspective. The only
way non-Muslim Danes can understand that Muslims feel hurt is by role-taking,
which requires that they step back from their own limited worldview and consider
the cartoons from the perspective of a devout Muslim. If Muslims can demand
such role-taking from members of the majority culture, however, then a principle of
reciprocity requires that they themselves must also be willing to step back from
their own culture. Both sides must abstract from their own culture to the extent
required for determining what is equally good for all and in order to establish a
public culture of mutual respect. If people with diﬀerent cultures are to live
together on equal and respectful terms, there is no way around the obligation to
determine these terms in common – and self-reﬂection and personal autonomy is a
precondition for this. Note that this conclusion does not require that one comes to
value autonomy as a fundamental human good, but only that one accepts that it is
a prerequisite for living in a just and respectful society.
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Is the implication of the preceding argument that there should be no (legal and
moral) constraints on how people speak to one another? Does it for example
mean that the Muhammad cartoons were a perfectly legitimate form of expres-
sion because they contribute to self-reﬂection among its addressees? This conclu-
sion would only be warranted if one held that self-reﬂection is an end in itself,
whereas I have argued that deliberative democracy is not committed to personal
autonomy as a fundamental human good. Rather, the aim is to determine what is
equally good for all and exercise moral autonomy in common. Self-reﬂection is
only valuable from the deliberative perspective if it leads to mutual learning
processes about the common good. Moreover, we must remember the epistemo-
logical argument, according to which moral insight only develops in communi-
cation among ‘diverse but mutually respectful human beings’. The epistemic aim
of deliberation is thus served not by any and all attempts at provoking self-
reﬂection but requires mutual respect. Why is that? The key reason is that dis-
respectful speech might discourage the addressees from participating in public
deliberation. Some forms of disrespectful expression might be ‘conversation stop-
pers’, because they aim at ‘others as targets rather than potential conversation
partners’.47 Some forms of speech lead to fear, ﬂight or ﬁght rather than any
learning process.48 Thus, I suggest that public expression should be constrained
by the ideal of not discouraging or disabling others from participating in public
deliberation as equals.49
However, this should only be a moral constraint, not a legal constraint. Recall
the suggestion that respect is both a prerequisite for and an outcome of public
deliberation. When we see public deliberation as a learning process, as the episte-
mological argument requires, we must await the process to have justiﬁable beliefs
about what is right and wrong. Nevertheless, we are never without some guidelines.
There has been public deliberation before in history, and the other cultures and
religions present in society are seldom completely foreign to us. We should there-
fore have the minimum understanding of respect that is necessary for deliberation
to result in a fuller and shared understanding of the norm. Still, some trial and
error is unavoidable. People will express themselves in ways that they did not
think were disrespectful, or at least not so hostile as to make the addressee
ﬂee or ﬁght. Making errors is part of learning processes, and legally prohibiting
the former might be at the cost of undermining the latter. Of course, one can
learn also from laws against e.g. hate speech;50 however, legal limits on speech
also cause people to limit themselves in ways that can keep certain ideas from
being expressed and would thus pre-empt learning processes. Legally enforced
respect will also tend to freeze a certain understanding of respect into law, and
this conception of respect will most likely not be a universally shared conception
but instead ‘express the mores of dominant groups’.51 Thus, if we see respect not
as a principle with a fully determined content but as something that must be con-
tinually reinterpreted and justiﬁed by members of all cultures in public delibera-
tion, then legal constraints aiming to secure respectful public deliberation can be
counterproductive.
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Constraints on public expression should ideally be products of learning
processes and self-imposed – and not legally imposed or products of fear.
Everyone ought to express him- or herself in ways that he or she, following his
or her best judgement, believes does not discourage others from participating in
public deliberation. The latter constraint might, however, lead to timidity and so
much fear of oﬀending others that important issues are not discussed, and parti-
cularly in a society in which people from diﬀerent cultural or religious backgrounds
tend to misunderstand and distrust each other this can be inhibiting for public
deliberation and its epistemic aims. Under such conditions, it is essential that cit-
izens also give each other some leeway for making errors and do not take any
mistake or small provocation as a sign of disrespect. The condition for this is that
people generally regard each other as being committed both to common delibera-
tion and to promoting the degree of self-reﬂection required for living together on
equal terms. If what we might refer to as an overall public culture of mutual respect
exists, then minor instances of disrespectful expression should be tolerated. The
aim of creating a public culture of mutual respect imposes obligations on both
speakers and listeners. Listeners (or viewers) can only be expected to give speakers
some leeway for making errors if they have reason to think that the latter were
actually attempting to promote common deliberation and mutual respect.
Conversely, listeners must give speakers reason to think that they, in general, are
committed to participating in common learning processes, to speaking and listen-
ing as equals, and not merely interested in creating antagonism with speakers.
How do we judge the Muhammad cartoons based on these guidelines? From the
perspective of the epistemological argument, one could ask whether the cartoons in
fact led to learning processes. However, it seems too restrictive to condemn expres-
sion that does not promote learning. Here again there should be room for trial and
error. Besides, it is extremely diﬃcult to judge the long-term eﬀects of the cartoons;
and should we be considering long- or short-term eﬀects? I ﬁnd it more promising
to consider the justiﬁcation behind the publication of the cartoons. Was Jyllands-
Posten interested in promoting not just self-reﬂection but also common delibera-
tion with Danish Muslims? Did the editors consider whether the cartoons would be
regarded as disrespectful? Was the newspaper and those who later defended it not
just interested in teaching but also in learning from others? Were they interested in
determining and justifying what it means to live on equal and respectful terms with
Danish Muslims, in common with the latter? If the answer to these questions is
‘No’ (and elsewhere I have given evidence that this is the case),52 I think there are
reasons to morally condemn the publication of the cartoons. However, we must
also consider whether the addressees fulﬁlled their obligations. The addressees also
have a moral obligation to attempt to consider the case from the perspective of the
other and not merely to consider how it looks from his or her cultural or religious
perspective. They must open themselves up to the degree of self-reﬂection and role-
taking that is necessary for living on respectful and equal terms with others who
have fundamentally diﬀerent commitments than they do. On that score, there are
surely examples of Muslims who failed to fulﬁl their moral obligations.
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Conclusion
Deliberative democracy is an autonomy-based theory and practice but this article
has argued that it is so in a way that is not untenably sectarian. The focus has been
on sectarianism in the justiﬁcation and application of freedom of expression based
on the principle of autonomy. The argued-for connection between freedom of
expression, public deliberation, and autonomy does not depend on a sectarian
conception of the good life, but rather on the conditions of respectful public expres-
sion and of reaching decisions that aim to be justiﬁable to all. Promoting some
degree of personal autonomy has been defended as instrumentally necessary for the
epistemic aims of public deliberation, not as good in itself. If some members of
society reject the promotion of personal autonomy entirely then they cannot with-
out contradiction simultaneously demand respect for their diﬀerences, for respect
for diﬀerence depends on some degree of self-reﬂection and role-taking. If they
reject political autonomy or participating in its exercise, then they are dependent on
others’ understanding of what it means to treat them as equals without their input.
The Danish cartoon controversy was considered as a possible example of the
alleged conﬂict between autonomy and respect for diversity. It was suggested that
the cartoons can be seen as exemplifying a conﬂict between autonomy and diversity
if they aimed to provoke self-reﬂection as an end in itself rather than at promoting
democratic deliberation and mutual respect. This, however, does not demonstrate a
necessary conﬂict between autonomy and diversity, for one can be committed to
promoting personal autonomy as a prerequisite for the common exercise of moral
and political autonomy, which again is necessary for establishing what equal
respect means and implies in particular cases. In the latter case, autonomy is
also regarded as part of the justiﬁcation for freedom of expression but the diﬀerent
aim implies constraints on how one expresses oneself in public. It requires that one
expresses oneself in ways that show that one is open to listen to and learn from
others, who on their side must also accept the obligation to participate in common
deliberation and stand back from their own particular commitments to the extent
required for understanding the diﬀerence between what is good for me and mine
and what can be justiﬁed to everybody given their diﬀerences.
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